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Mr Chairman, Ladles an~ Gentlemen, 
I would 1 ike to thank you and the Foreign Trade Association 
of Southern Cal lfornla for the chance of sharing some 
thoughts with you today on the relationship across the 
Atlantic. And for the Invitation to come again to the West 
Coast. For a European It Is always a delight to be here. 
But It Is also a challenge. For to be on the Pacific 
seaboard of this great continent provokes for us a question. 
Where Is Europe In the International economic and trading 
scene which Is your world and does It matter very much when 
you get there? 
Any European 1 Iv Ing In the United States quickly understands 
this paradox. Some of the old 1 Inks with Europe have been 
weakened. The generation of post-war American statesmen who 
were mixed up In the reconstruction of Europe after the war 
Is now largely gone. There has been a shift In wealth and 
power from the North-East to the South and the West. In 
1918, Cal lfornla had 2 mill Ion people, now It has 24. The 
demographic centre of the United States Is now west of the 
Mississippi. The demographic centre Is In fact moving West 
at the rate of some 55 feet per year. The distribution of 
seats in the House has been altered In favour of the South 
and the West. So this has led naturally enough to a greater 
Interest In the Pacific rim, to a lesser Interest In Europe. 
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But at the same time there has been a dramatic change In the 
Involvement of the United States In the outside world. For 
something like one hundred years after the Civil War, 
foreign trade was never more than 4 to 5 percent of American 
GNP. Then In the 1970s there was an explosion. Now the 
figure Is 12 percent and rising. 
One fifth of American Industrial production Is exported, 40 
percent of American farm land Is devoted to exports. Thus 
foreign trade has played a dramatic part In the fivefold 
Increase In real terms In American GNP between 1939 and 
1986. Foreign trade Is now an Indispensable part of 
American prosperity. And central to American foreign trade 
and the standard of living of the United States Is the 
relationship across the Atlantic. 
In 1986 the twelve member European Community emerged as the 
largest export market of the United States - and as a 
customs union with a single external tariff and no tariffs 
between our Member States we are entitled to regard 
ourselves as one market. That year US exports to the 
Community totalled $53 bill ion compared with $45 billion to 
Canada and $27 bill Ion to Japan. Total US trade (exports 
and Imports) with the Community was $133 bill Ion. And all 
this over low tariffs and with very few Import restrictions. 
' 
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As George Shultz said ln Brussels a couple of years back -
we must be doing something right. 
The second reason goes wider. The Community accounts for 
something 1 Ike one-fifth of world trade, the United States 
for about 15 percent. So together we account for more than 
one-third of world trade. And this places on us both very 
heavy responslbil ltles. For If any mutual escalation of 
trade restrictions were to break out, If the shutters were 
to come clanging down on both sides of the Atlantic, then 
the one world trading system which has underpinned over the 
last forty years the biggest rise in prosperity In the 
recorded history of the world would be bust. And we would 
be back sooner than many of you could bel !eve not only to 
the poverty and the misery of the 1930s but to some of the 
terrible pol ltlcal ghosts which haunt every Journey through 
an economic wasteland. 
The third reason goes even wider. Europe and the United 
States, whatever arguments we may have from time to time, 
share common democratic values. No European should forget 
the Marshall Plan, the Berlin airlift, the founding of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization In the common defence of 
freedom and the generous and statesmanl Ike support which the 
United States gave to the beginning of European unification 
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in the 1950s. These common values are not put at risk by 
trade disputes. But the sol ldarity of the Western All lance 
would Inevitably be shaken by an all out trade war. 
All this Is not to say that the International economic 
environment depends only on the transatlantic relationship. 
Quite apart from the problems you have with Japan and some 
Industrial Ising countries in East Asia there are some 
formidible general questions. Can the debt crisis of the 
developing countries be maintained by prudence and wisdom 
from both borrowers and lenders? Can exchange rate 
instabil lty be contained before it puts an intolerable 
strain on the one world trading system? 
These are reasonable, Indeed essential, questions. But 
there Is another question I would 1 Ike to concentrate on 
today. That is the question of protectionism. 
Protectionist pressures have reached such a dangerous point 
that they pose a threat to the entire world trading system. 
I am conscious so that I run the risk of seeming to single 
out pressure in Washington for protectionist measures as the 
centre of the world's Ills. This would be a one-sided 
presentation. Americans have every right to expect not 
lecturing by foreigners but a fair and balanced discussion 
of mutual problems. So a fair question at this stage is what 
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is Europe doing about protectionism? Is It protectionist In 
Industry or In agriculture? What Is Its pol Icy on world 
trad~? What Is It doing about Its growth and unemployment? 
These are fair questions. So let me try to deal with them. 
First Is the European Community protectionist? Our 
Industrial tariff averages something 1 Ike 4!%. This Is about 
the same average as the US tariff. But over 10% of US 
Industrial Imports come In with a tariff of over 15%, some 
more than 40%. Only one percent of EC Industrial Imports 
come In with tariffs of 10% or more. Our tariff on all 
Imports If we take Into account our measures to help 
developing countries averages only 1%. 
What about the loss of Jobs caused by Imports? Senator Dole 
once pointed out that In the last ten years the United 
States has lost over 600,000 Jobs in Just three Industries 
alone, textiles and apparel, steel and footwear. This Is 
certainly a tough problem. But the corresponding figure for 
the Community Is one and a half mill Ion. Textile Imports 
have doubled over ten years leaving us with an Import 
penetration level more than twice that In the United States. 
But we are not contemplating any new restrictions on 
Imports. Steel Imports have been cut, this we had to do 
because we have forced through between 1980 and 1985 
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reductions of 32 million tons of capacity - with another 20 
mill ion scheduled to go over the following three years. But 
the reductions in imports have been moderate compared with 
US Import cuts. 
I do not think anyone could fairly claim this shows the 
Community to be protectionist. 
"Ah" folks will then say, "what about agriculture?" The CAP 
has become the Great Scapegoat of the Western World. But 
this is an affair more of myths than of reality. Let me 
quickly dispose of some of the myths. It has been alleged 
that we subsidize our agriculture far more than anyone else. 
In fact, last year the Community subsidized 11 mill Ion 
farmers to the tune of $22 billion, compared with $26 
bill ton of farm price support expenditure on 2.5 mill Ion 
farmers In the United States. A very senior US official 
recently said In testimony before a Committee of Congress 
that the EC comes only third In the agricultural subsidies 
league after Japan and the US. Moreover, Incomes of EC 
farmers have fallen by 30 percent over the past 10 years, 
compared with a rise of 19 percent In general Community 
Incomes. 
7 
Secondly, does the Community with this pol Icy shut out US 
farm exports? For fiscal 1986 the Community retained Its 
position as the biggest US farm export market, $6.4 billion 
compared to $5.1 billion of exports to Japan. Moreover, 
while US farm exports to non-EEC countries In 1986 nosedived 
by 19 percent, exports to the EC hardly dropped at all - by 
Just 3 percent. We now take a quarter of all US overseas 
sales of farm products. We are not only the American 
farmer's best customer, but the biggest Importer of farm 
products In the world. 
Third, are we engaged In massive undercutting of American 
farm products on world markets with our subsidized exports? 
The fact is that the Community and the United States compete 
only over about a quarter of US farm exports, mainly wheat 
and, to a lesser extent, dairy products. The International 
trading rules provide that agricultural export subsidies are 
permitted but should not be used to get more than an 
equitable share of the world market. What then has happened 
to the EC share of the world market In wheat and dairy 
products? The high point of American wheat exports was 
1981-82, when the US accounted for 49 percent of the world 
market. In 1984-85 this had dropped to 36 percent. Was 
this the Community's responslbll lty? Hardly, since our 
share remained stable between 14 and 16 percent. That of 
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other exporters rose much more sharply. What about dairy 
products? For years the American share of the world market 
was nil. In 1985 It was 10 percent, an Increase achieved 
mainly at the EC's expense. 
These are the facts. They describe, 1 ike an oil painting, a 
picture. But what Is the future? Are we going In a 
protectionist sense or not? Let me give you three reasons 
why we are on the side of the angels - slowly and painfully 
maybe, but pointed in the right direction. The first Is 
agriculture. We have made It clear that we are will Ing to 
negotiate about agriculture In the new trade round launched 
last September at Punta del Este. Our motive here Is the 
best possible one - one of self-Interest. We are the 
biggest player on the world trading stage, with 20 percent 
of world trade. We realise that the one world trading 
system enshrined In the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs cannot be kept going without successive major trade 
negotiations. And given the Importance of agriculture In 
world trade today, a negotiation cannot take place without 
agriculture. So we need to negotiate about agriculture. 
What we are not will Ing to do ls single out simply our 
export subsidies as the negotiating agenda. We want 
everything on the deck. And we are not much attracted by 
the Idea of putting agriculture on a special "fast tract". 
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A settlement In an area as Important and huge as agriculture 
cannot realistically be reached in advance of the other main 
components of the negotiation. But the key to a solution In 
this area seems to me not In the framing of the GATT wording 
- helpful and supportive though this will finally be - but 
In tackling government subsidies to farmers on both sides of 
the Atlantic which, with the Inexorable march of 
productivity, are pushing up production surplus on a 
saturated world market. 
And here the Community has made a start. In 1984 the 
Community decided to cut dairy output and by 1985 it had 
already fallen by between 4 and 5 percent. Support prices 
for grain were frozen last spring for the third consecutive 
year. Production has been made less attractive and returns 
to farmers have been reduced by at least 15 percent. 
Furthermore, In December last year the Council of Ministers 
agreed that dairy production be cut over a two-year period 
by Just under 10 percent and that the price of beef should 
be reduced by some 13 percent. The EC butter mountain - now 
some 1.5 mill ion metric tons or more than 80 percent of 
world stocks will be brought down to 350,000 tonnes and the 
beef mountain should be cut by some 50 percent by the end of 
1987. 
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These agreements are the biggest changes In the Common 
Agricultural Pol Icy since It was establ !shed In 1962. They 
will result In savings from the 1989 budget of between $1 
and 2 bill Ion. I need hardly add that these cuts have been 
very unpopular with Community farmers. Bankruptcies and 
foreclosures are not an exclusively American problem. Many 
European farmers were forced out of business by earl ler 
cutbacks. Many more will be now. So we watch with 
sympathetic Interest the proposals now being formulated by 
the United States administration to trim Its own farm 
support programme in the years ahead. In the meantime, we 
in Europe can already point to decisive and painful action 
on this path. 
Then second the question of growth. I have the feel Ing 
living In Washington that we In the Community have come to 
be regarded as economic stumblebums. So let me set out some 
facts which I hope wl 1 l correct this impression. From 1970 
through 1980 EC annual growth averaged 3.1 percent, while US 
growth was 2.7 percent. In 1985, EC growth was 2.4 percent, 
while the US economy expanded by 2.7 percent. Growth In 
1986 for both the EC and the US was the same, 2.5 percent. 
In 1987, our forcastlng services in the Commission reckon 
that the Community will expand at about 2.3 percent and the 
US by some 2.4 percent. 
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So our track record ls·not so different. But this Is not an 
excuse to refrain from doing better and here we can point to 
progress among the six major Industrial countries to promote 
a more balanced global growth, reduce existing Imbalances 
and stabilize exchange rates. I would pay tribute here to 
the Initiatives of Treasury Secretary Baker. It was in no 
small measure due to him that at the Paris meeting of 
February 22 It was Industrial countries with external 
surpluses who committed themselves to strengthening demand 
while those In deficit would reduce their domestic 
Imbalances and external deficits. Europe played Its part. 
Within this framework Germany pledged to propose an Increase 
In the size of the tax reduction already enacted for 1988 
and to consider a comprehensive tax reform to take place In 
1990. 
A third factor Is the Community Internal market. We have 
managed to abolish tariffs between Member States. This was 
no negl lglble achievement If you reflect that the tariff 
rates between Member States In the late 1950s were as high 
as 50-60 percent. But there still remain a range of 
internal barriers which Impede trade between our Member 
States - frontier formal ltles, different technical standards 
and government purchasing requirements. So the Commission 
put to the Council In 1985 a precise programme with 300 
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proposals, name tag and timetable attached. If this 
programme ls adopted as we hope by 1992, It will mean that 
by that date businessmen will be able to trade and Invest In 
a single market of 320 mill Ion people as easily as they can 
between the States of the Union here. This could mean a 
near doubling of our standard of living. That would be 
quite some growth and it would not only mean a more 
prosperous Europe; It would mean an even better trading 
partner for the United States. 
I hope that what I have set out Is a fair and reasonable 
account of the contribution the Community has made In 
keeping open Its market and resisting protectionism and 
contributing to growth. I do not say that we have all the 
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answers or that angels' wings are sprouting on our side of 
the Atlantic. But 1 Ike the pianist In the Western saloon we 
are doing our best. 
What about the situation here? We all know about the 
protectionist pressures In Congress. This Is not to 
criticise. This Is simply to observe. With a trade deficit 
of $170 bill Ion Americans are worried understandably about 
their Jobs. 
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But In all this there ls one dangerous folly which appl tes 
not simply to the United States but to any country tn a 
similar situation. To think that you can deal with a trade 
deficit by legislation ls a mistake. Trade legislation can 
do some very useful things. It can give the administration 
authority for a new trade round. It can help In such areas 
as training, readjustment and education. But some Ideas do 
not help. If a boondoggle Is defined as "any project on 
which government funds are wasted" (I quote from Will lam 
Saftre's Pol ltlcal Dictionary), then a project which would 
result In a loss of Jobs can good be called jobsdoggltng. 
There ls a good deal around. Let us look at some of the 
examples. 
A bill has been Introduced which would limit textile Imports 
to their 1986 level and restrict growth to 1 percent a year. 
This could only be achieved either by reneging on the 
agreements with developing countries recently negotiated 
under the Multlftber Arrangement (MFA) or by cutting exports 
of textiles to the US from the EC or both. Either course 
would mean the end of the MFA and would be likely to provoke 
retal tat ton. Certainly, If restrictions were Imposed on 
European exports of textiles to the US, the Community would 
be 1 lkely to retal late with restrictions on US textile 
exports to Europe, which are up 42 percent from last year 
and still rising. Result: Loss of American Jobs. 
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A second Jobsdoggle ts· requiring countries with a large 
current account surplus with the US to cut the surplus 
dramatically or face a special tariff. This would confl let 
with International obl lgatlons, throw a large wrench Into 
the current round of trade negotiations and could easily 
boomerang. Other countries could pass similar legislation. 
In 1980, the US ran a surplus with the Community of $18 
billion. Would the US appreciate ft ff, when It gets Into a 
surplus position again with a number of Its Important 
trading partners, tariff Increases were to be Imposed on 
American exports? In the meantime, the result would be 
retaliation and the loss of American Jobs. 
A third Jobsdoggle Is reciprocity sector by sector. It has 
been argued that unless foreigners give the US equal 
treatment in certain specific sectors such as 
telecommunications, barriers should be erected against their 
exports of the same products to the United States. First, 
deregulation In the US telecommunications area, to take this 
as an example, did not happen overnight. The process 
started In 1968 and Is still going on. Second, the US has a 
surplus, not a deficit, of $500 mill Ion with the EC In 
telecommunications equipment and of several billion dollars 
If one considers telecommunications and computers together. 
Finally, everyone can find sectors In which one country 
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g Ives better treatment· than others. In the case of woo 1 
textiles, for Instance, tariffs In the Community are less 
than half those In the United States. To some, this would 
be a case where the Community could Insist on reciprocity. 
To try and get reciprocity In every specific sector would 
mean massive new restrictions sprouting up everywhere on 
world trade. Reciprocity Is essential In trade 
negotiations. But It can only be achieved by overall 
reciprocity: trading off the disadvantages In one sector 
for advantages In another. Forcing reciprocity In one 
sector by Imposing barriers would simply lead to retal latlon 
from the other party. Result: Loss of American Jobs. 
A fourth Jobsdoggle Is action, possibly of an automatic 
kind, under Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974 (unfair 
trading practices). It Is all very well to ask for tough 
and aggressive action under domestic legislation, but unfair 
trade practices generally turn out to be what the other 
fellow does - never what one does oneself. What really 
matters ls whether actions by a contracting party of the 
GATT are In confl let with the International trading rules. 
Otherwise "tough" action by the US will be followed by 
equally tough action by others against US exports. And It 
should always be remembered that while the International 
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trading rules on, say,· subsidies and dumping may not be 
perfect, they are the only rules we have. Amending them 
should be done by multilateral agreement, not unilateral 
action which could simply result in retaliation by others 
against American exports. Result: Loss of American jobs. 
Of course, we do not know as yet quite In what form 
legislation will emerge from Congress. The Administration 
have - very rightly - opposed protectionist provisions. But 
the fundamental point for us all to bear In mind Is that 
there is no quick fix to a trade deficit. To try and do so 
by legislation which bashes foreigners invites retal iatton 
and Is simply self-defeating. The real solution l tes In 
reducing the budget deficit in an appropriate exchange rate 
and Increasing competitiveness. Five mill ton American jobs 
now depend on exports, both In the farm sector and In 
Industry. Some of the proposals I have mentioned may sound 
superficially attractive as a means of reducing the trade 
deficit, but In practice they would simply result In the 
loss of hundreds of thousands of American Jobs. 
I do not make these points In a quarrelsome or hostile way. 
The world owes an enormous amount to American support over 
the years, for the one world trading system and for the 
leadership the United States suppl led In supporting and 
.. 
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heading some major traae negotiations. But the privilege of 
friendship Is frankness. 
You have a major macro-economic question In terms of the 
budget deficit. We have problems with unemployment and 
growth. Let us both take our macroeconomic 
responsibil ltles. Let us keep our cool In the trade 
arguments which we have Inevitably from time to time. Let 
us work together in the areas where we can - the new trade 
round and the problems of indebtedness of developing 
countries. And let us hope that on this path we can 
together keep the one world trading system which, with all 
its imperfections, has made possible over the last 40 years 
the biggest Increase in prosperity In the recorded history 
of the West. 
If I have spoken at length about the European perspective, 
let me try and adjust the balance by a quotation from a 
great American. As long ago as 1844 Emerson wrote some 
lines about trade and America which are worth recalling 
today. He wrote, I quote, "The philosopher and lover of man 
have much harm to say of trade but historians will see that 
trade was the principle of 1 lberty. That trade planted 
America and destroyed feudal ism. That It makes peace, and 
keeps peace, and it will abol lsh slavery". Let us on both 
sides of the Atlantic try and comport ourselves In our 
economic relationship that we can remain faithful to the 
memory of these words. 
